This paper assesses resource misallocation dynamics and its impact on aggregate TFP in the French manufacturing sector between 1990 and 2015. I provide an exact decomposition of allocational inefficiency into three components: labor misallocation, capital misallocation, and a third term representing the interplay between both. Misallocation increased substantially between 1997 and 2007, generating a loss in annual TFP growth of roughly 0.8 percentage points. This increase is mainly related to labor misallocation, except at the beginning of the 2000s, when capital misallocation played the leading role. The impact of allocational efficiency during the Great Recession is sizeable: misallocation accounts for roughly 25% of the 2007-2009 decline in TFP and 20% of the improvement observed in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. The main feature behind the rise in misallocation during the crisis is the predominance of the interplay component, which is stable the rest of the time. It suggests that one should pay special attention to mechanisms disrupting both labor and capital markets in the wake of financial crises. Finally, allocational efficiency remains rather constant after 2010: the post-crisis slowdown in productivity growth is therefore even more pronounced for efficient TFP than for observed TFP. 
Evolution of misallocation in the French manufacturing sector
Source: author's computations using FiBEn data. All series are in logs.
The framework used to measure misallocation relies on the definition of individual production functions and output aggregators. By maximizing total output one can derive the optimal inputs allocation and the efficient level of aggregate production. Comparing with the observed aggregate output provides a measure of the loss in TFP which can be imputed to misallocation of resources. Assuming that consumers are price-takers and spend optimally the optimal allocation is such that marginal revenue products of inputs are equalized. The ratio between the observed marginal revenue products and their optimal values can therefore be seen as distortions driving the economy away from the efficient allocation. Labor (resp. capital) misallocation is thus measured as the boost in aggregate TFP one would obtain by optimally reallocating labor (resp. capital) in the absence of any capital (resp. labor) distortion. The effect of the interplay between the two kinds of misallocation is then measured as the variation in allocational efficiency that does not come from neither labor nor capital misallocation. This effect asymptotically converges to the covariance between labor and capital distortions and therefore reflects
Introduction
The efficiency of inputs allocation among heterogeneous production units has recently been the subject of a vigorous interest from the economics profession. Taking advantage of the increasing availability of large micro datasets, this lively branch of the economic literature has emphasized the role of resource misallocation in accounting for differences in aggregate productivity, both across countries (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009 ) and over time (Gopinath et al., 2017) . Exploring the micro determinants of total factor productivity (TFP) is all the more relevant at a time when its evolution during and after the Great Recession is the subject of a particular concern. 1 In this paper, I assess misallocation and its impact on the evolution of aggregate productivity before, during, and after the Great Recession. To do so I make use of a large dataset covering a wide sample of French firms and focus on the manufacturing sector. 2 I decompose TFP into two components, one reflecting the optimal level of aggregate productivity and the other the loss in TFP due to micro distortions affecting firms inputs demands. To go further I provide an exact decomposition of the misallocation component between three distinct parts, measuring respectively the effect of labor misallocation (i.e. the gain in TFP from removing labor distortions when capital is efficiently allocated), the effect of capital misallocation (i.e. the gain in TFP from removing capital distortions when labor is efficiently allocated), and the interplay between these two sorts of distortions.
As long as consumers spend optimally, aggregate output is maximized when inputs are allocated such that firms' marginal revenue products (MRP) are equalized. As a result distortions driving these marginal revenue products away from the optimal level and creating dispersion in producers MRP also generates a loss in total production. The ratio between the optimal level of output and the actual one is therefore an intuitive and comprehensive measure of the level of efficiency associated to the observed input allocation (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009) . As aggregate inputs stocks are kept constant when comparing various allocations this measure also represents the ratio between the aggregate TFP which would be observed under an efficient allocation of resources, and the one which is observed 1 under the actual allocation. Differences in aggregate TFP therefore derive from changes in efficient productivity and changes in the measure of misallocation. 3 Seminal articles in the misallocation literature have focused on resource allocation as a source of measured TFP differences across countries, which itself accounts for large portion of differences in output per capita. 4 Banerjee and Duflo (2005) provide evidence from the microdevelopment literature of enormous dispersion of rates of return to the same factor within a single economy. In light of these empirical facts they argue that misallocation is an important source of productivity differences across countries. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) use a modified version of the standard growth model to make similar conclusions, showing in particular that policies creating prices heterogeneity in the supply-side of the economy can lead to sizeable decreases in output and TFP. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) (HK hereafter) use micro-data on manufacturing plants to show that hypothetically reallocating inputs to equalize marginal products to the extent observed in the US would increase TFP by 30 to 50% in China and by 40 to 60% in India. In this paper I perform a quantitative exercise inspired by the HK methodology; while they find that equalizing marginal revenue products within industries would increase US manufacturing TFP by 30.7 % in 1987 and by 42.9 % in 1997, I find from 1990 to 2015 an average TFP loss of 28.6 % for the French manufacturing sector (22.2 in 1990, 22.9 in 1997) .
It suggests that while allocational efficiency could largely explain differences in TFP between developed and developing countries, there is no evidence that France may suffer from such an efficiency gap compared to the US. 5 A growing strand of the literature has also explored the evolution of misallocation over time and its impact on TFP growth. In particular, recent articles have focused on the role of allocational efficiency in accounting for the relatively poor economic performance in various Southern European countries since the late 1990's (see Reis (2013) ; Dias et al. (2015) for Portugal, Calligaris (2015) for Italy, Garcia-Santana et al. (2016) for Spain). These articles find a significant increase in misallocation over time, implying a sizeable loss in annual output and productivity growth. Consistently with these empirical findings, I show that the French manufacturing sector experienced during the decade preceding the Great Recession a deterioration of allocational 3 Importantly one has to be cautious when interpreting changes in misallocation as a decreasing or increasing scope for welfare-improving policies. As emphasized by Asker et al. (2014) Gopinath et al. (2017) . They document a significant increase in the dispersion of capital MRP, a flat dispersion of labor MRP, and a deterioration of allocational efficiency in Spain, Italy, and Portugal. 6 They then show theoretically that this is the outcome of an economy where financial constraints direct capital inflows to firms that have higher net worth but are not necessarily more productive. 7 Interestingly I find that misallocation in the French manufacturing sector is mainly related to a rise in capital misallocation during the few years following the creation of the euro. 8 Outside this period I find that the deterioration of allocational efficiency is mainly related to an increase of labor misallocation.
This paper also contributes to the literature linking the huge drops observed in TFP during depressions with resource allocation. Decline in aggregate productivity is a notable feature of crisis episodes (Kehoe and Prescott, 2002; Calvo et al., 2006) , and the Great Recession makes no exception (Christiano et al., 2015) . Various articles find that inputs misallocation contributes significantly to the decrease in measured TFP during financial crises (see Oberfield (2013) papers have endogenized TFP as depending on financial frictions in models with heterogeneous production units (see Midrigan and Xu (2014); Moll (2014) ; Buera and Moll (2015) among others). In particular, credit market imperfections and their impact on capital misallocation are often seen as the main channel explaining the drop in TFP during the Great Recession (Khan and Thomas, 2013; Di Nola, 2015) . To assess the relative role of capital and labor misallocation I provide in this paper an exact decomposition of HK's measure of allocational efficiency between three components, respectively reflecting the pure effect of labor misallocation, the pure effect of capital misallocation and the interplay between both kinds of misallocation. Under rather strong assumptions, namely idiosyncratic distortions and productivities are jointly lognormally distributed and the number of firms per sector is large, misallocation can be written as a weighted sum of the variances of labour and capital MRP and of the covariance between both. These moments are therefore widely used by the literature as alternative measures of allocational efficiency or as reflecting the relative strengths of labor and capital misallocation. 9
The decomposition I propose, which still relies on the HK famework, has three advantages compared with the previous one. First, it does not rely on the above-mentioned assumptions.
Importantly, even if one is ready to accept these assumptions, the decomposition I propose is shown to be in this case strictly equivalent to the log-normal approximation. Second, it has a more immediate economic interpretation in terms of output loss. Third, it does not ignore other important factors affecting misallocation, such as the correlation between idiosyncratic TFP and distortions on inputs MRP. 10 I use this decomposition to show that the main factor behind the deterioration of allocational efficiency in the French manufacturing sector during the Great Recession is the increase of the interplay component, whereas pure capital or labor misallocation by itself can only account for a small part of the rise in misallocation. Therefore I
argue that theoretical and quantitative models intending to reproduce the impact of misallocation on aggregate productivity during the crisis should be able to replicate such feature. More precisely, models where misallocation derives exclusively from distortions on capital MRP (or equivalently solely from distortions on labor MRP) may miss an important driving force.
Finally I examine the role of misallocation in shaping the post-crisis slowdown in aggregate productivity. The reduced TFP growth in the US and in Europe in the wake of the GreatRecession is a hotly debated issue. While some argue that the huge drop in economic activity experienced during the crisis damaged the productive capacity of the economy and lead to the post-crisis slowdown in TFP (Reifschneider et al., 2015; Anzoategui et al., 2016) , others claim that productivity growth slowed prior to the Great Recession, ruling out causal effect of the 9 See for example Larrain and Stumpner (2017) . 10 Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) stress that distortions that are correlated with idiosyncratic productivity considerably worsen misallocation. The fact that such correlation does not appear in the log approximation is also emphasized by Gilchrist et al. (2013) . crisis itself (Fernald, 2015) . Given the various empirical evidence documenting the sizeable impact of misallocation on measured productivity one may wonder to what extent this anemic growth can be a byproduct of changes in the efficiency of resource allocation. 11 I show that a drop in misallocation in the immediate aftermath of the crisis can accout for roughly 20% of the 2010 recovery in observed manufacturing TFP. 12 On the other hand I find that after this sharp recovery allocational efficiency remains essentially flat. As misallocation increased during the decade preceding the Great Recession, the efficient TFP growth rate was higher than the observed TFP growth rate during this period. The post-crisis slowdown in productivity growth is therefore even more pronounced for efficient TFP than for observed TFP: misallocation does not appear as a driver of TFP stagnation.
The road map for the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops a simple theoretical framework inspired by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) I consider an economy composed of S distinct sectors. There are n s firms operating in sector s, each firm producing a differentiated good. Individual production functions 13 and aggregators at the sectoral level and at the economy level are given by :
Resources are optimally allocated within sector s if and only if, given the total stocks of inputs available in this sector, the distribution of capital and labor across firms is such that the maximum level of output is attained. Formally, the efficient allocation {k * is , l * is } i≤ns and the optimal level of sectoral production Y * s are the solution of the following maximization program:
First order conditions write:
Assume that on the demand side a representative consumer with an exogenous revenue R wants to maximize its aggregate consumption :
p is y is ≤ R First order conditions define total demand for each differenciated good y d is :
where γ is the shadow price associated with the consumer's budget constraint, and is normalized to 1. Combining equations (4) and (5) with equation (6) and under market clearing one obtain that the efficient resource allocation is such that marginal revenue products are equalized for all firms operating in sector s :
Let's define sectoral price as the ratio between sectoral nominal value-added and sectoral physical output :
Now assume that F s is homogeneous of degree one. By Euler's homogeneous function theorem one gets from equation (6) the following demand equations:
Denoting p * is and P * s the equilibrium prices when the input allocation is efficient, equations (4), (5) and (8) imply that under allocational efficiency individual marginal revenue products are equal to sectoral MRP:
It is quite standard in the literature on misallocation to map observed marginal revenue products onto exogenous distortions. Under the previous framework it is intuitive to define these distortions as wedges driving marginal revenue products away from their within-sector optimal levels. 14 Formally:
Using equations (7), (9) and (10) one can easily show that these two distortions write :
14 It is important to keep in mind that these exogenous distortions can reflect a large set of frictions, like for example financial constraints, physical adjustment costs, firing costs, heterogeneous mark-ups among others.
Production functions and output aggregators
To bring this framework to the data one requires functional-form assumptions on production functions and on output aggregation. I follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and use a constant return to scale production function. The output of each sector is the outcome of aggregating the differentiated goods in a CES manner. Finally, sectoral aggregates are combined into a single aggregate good using a Cobb-Douglas production technology.
z is is the idiosyncratic productivity of firm i in sector s. 15 ρ s is the elasticity of substitution between goods within sector s. Notice that output elasticities are allowed to differ across industries but not across firms within a given industry.
Under the previous functional-form assumptions demand equations (7) and (8) write:
I follow Foster et al. (2008) by distinguishing between revenue productivity (TFPR) and physical productivity (TFPQ) :
In most firm-level datasets variables are expressed in nominal terms and firm-specific prices are 15 Here idiosyncratic productivity is considered as exogenous. See Syverson (2011) for a survey on the determinants of micro-productivity.
8 not available, which makes revenue productivity easier to measure than physical productivity. 16 Using demand equations one can derive physical productivity from nominal value-added and inputs quantities:
Interestingly, the previous equation implies that in a given sector and at a given time period one can obtain relative idiosyncratic productivities without using sectoral deflators (and therefore avoiding a potential source of measurement error, since the use of sectoral deflators would mean that differences in firm-specific prices would show up in the measure of physical productivities).
Capital, labor and the log-normality assumption
The previous assumptions on production functions and sectoral aggregators imply that the capital (labor) elasticity of individual output in sector s is equal to the capital (labor) elasticity of the sectoral production function one obtain under optimal allocation. The Cobb-Douglas aggregator implies that the sectoral output elasticity of aggregate production is a constant.
Therefore from equations (11) and (12) labor distortions and capital distortions write:
One can express observed aggregate TFP at the sectoral level as a function of idiosyncratic productivities and capital and labor distortions:
From equation (21) 
M s,k and M s,l measure respectively the extent of capital and labor misallocation in sector s, making use of the theoretical framework previously defined. To disentangle these two types of misallocation the literature has widely used reduced-form estimates, in particular looking at measures of MRP dispersion. 17 Indeed, under the assumption that idiosyncratic productivity, capital distortion and labor distortion are jointly log-normal within each sector one can show that (see Appendix A):
Under this approximation misallocation can come from either dispersion in log-MRPK, dispersion in log-MRPL, or correlation between the two distortions. If labor distortions are equalized the variance of log-MRPK is the only source of misallocation, and therefore constitutes a sufficient statistic to measure "pure" capital misallocation. Although very useful, this approximation may seem unsatisfying for several reasons. First, it necessitates additional assumptions with respect to the HK framework (the log-normality assumption, and the fact that the number of firms per sector need to be large). More importantly, the correlation between idiosyncratic productivities and distortions does not appear in this decomposition, whereas misallocation is worse when firms that suffer from a lack of resources (i.e., firms with high MRP) are also the most productive ones. 18 The measures of capital and labor misallocation I propose stick to the structural framework without any further assumptions, and do not ignore the above-mentioned correlation.
I define a third term, representing the impact of the interaction between labor and capital distortions, such that the log of sectoral misallocation is equal to the sum of the log of each component:
It can be shown (Appendix A) that under the log-normality assumption each part of equation (26) is directly related to its counterpart in equation (25):
Therefore, and importantly, even if one is ready to consider as plausible the assumptions needed to get equation (25), and to overlook the fact that it ignores important factors affecting
18 See Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Gilchrist et al. (2013) .
misallocation, the decomposition I propose would be in this case strictly equivalent to the lognormal approximation.
Misallocation and aggregate TFP
Aggregate TFP is given by:
and aggregate misallocation is a simple function of sectoral misallocations :
Therefore variation in observed aggregate TFP over time can be decomposed into variations in efficient TFP and variations in misallocation:
Variation in aggregate misallocation can itself be decomposed using equation (26) into three components: capital misallocation, labor misallocation and the interaction term. I drop from the dataset observations for which the basic accounting equality does not hold.
When the average number of employees declared by the firm is equal to zero I set this variable as missing. Restricting the database to the manufacturing sector the dataset is an unbalanced panel of approximately 1,100,000 observations covering a total of about 110,000 firms. Table   1 provides descriptive statistics for some variables of interest, including nominal value added (given by the difference between gross output and intermediate consumptions), payments to labor, tangible and intangible fixed assets, and average number of employees. Table 2 ). In comparison the dataset covers in average 50.9% of total nominal value-added in services 21 (53.9% for wages, 52.9% for employment), 45.8% in the construction sector (50.9% for wages, 57.2% for employment) and 10.1% in the agricultural sector (29% for wages, 17.9% for employment). Therefore I focus in the rest of the paper on the manufacturing industry, in line with numerous articles in the misallocation literature.
Throughout my analysis I assume that industries in my framework correspond to three-
19 Because I use the lag value of fixed assets in order to define the capital stock variable I drop the first year of observations in my dataset, which therefore goes from 1990 to 2015.
20 As I do not control for employees who work in multiple jobs the representativeness in terms of employment may be slightly overestimated. However this remark does not apply to wages or value-added.
21 Excluding financial and real estate activities. Importantly, entry and exit from the dataset do not correspond to actual entry and exit; firms may disappear from the dataset when their sales fall below the 750,000 euros threshold, and exit may also reflect restructurations and takeovers rather than firms shutting down their businesses. Finally, I emphasize that I work only with unconsolidated accounts.
Estimation of the parameters
I now describe how I infer the parameters used in the theoretical framework from the dataset.
In a perfect economy with no frictions one would naturally approximate the elasticity of output with respect to labor by the share of nominal value-added devoted to nominal expenditure on 22 The FIBEN database use the NACE classification (European standard classification of productive economic activities).
23 In some studies labor input is measured by the wage bill. The main assumption is that wages per worker enable to adjust the measure of idiosyncratic productivities to firm differences in hours worked per worker and in workers skills. However differences in wages may also be explained by rent sharing and by wage bargaining between the firms and the workers. I will use this alternative specification as a robustness check.
24 The average number of hours worked by employee for a given year, the investment deflators and the valueadded deflators are taken from the INSEE database (available online), although the data are given for a broader level of aggregation than the three-digit level.
labor. But as the whole analysis relies on the existence of distortions driving the economy away from an efficient optimum one cannot separately identify differences in technology and differences in distortions from differences in factor expenditure shares. I assume that on average firms within a given industry are undistorted (even if a particular firm still may face a distortion in a particular year). More precisely, I compute for each year and for each firm operating in industry s its labor expenditure share 25 and I assume that the median of this variable over the years and over the firms reflects the true value of the elasticity of output with respect to labor. Then under the assumption of constant return to scale it is straightforward to deduce for each industry the elasticity of output with respect to capital. 26 As stressed by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) another issue that arises when deducing production elasticities from factor shares is that we have to take into account the markups associated with the market power of the firms in these differentiated good industries. I assume that rents coming from these markups are divided between workers and capital owners proportionally to the factor expenditure shares, and directly appear in the payments to labor used to deduce output elasticities.
In order to measure sectors' shares θ s I compute for each year and for each sector the ratio of the sectoral nominal value added to total nominal value added in the economy. These parameters are time-varying.
Most empirical studies in the misallocation literature set the elasticity of substitution between goods ρ s equal to an arbitrary value, considered as the same for all sectors in the economy.
In line with these studies I set ρ s equal to 3 in my baseline computations. However this assumption may seem unsatisfying, as the value of the elasticity of substitution is bound to vary across sectors and probably impacts the magnitude of the results. As a matter of fact, it determines the sectoral aggregates (equation (14)), the elasticity of the individual demand equations (equation (17)) and the measures of idiosyncratic productivity (equation (18)). Allowing elasticities to vary across sectors constitutes therefore an important step forward. As a robustness check I estimate sector specific elasticities, using an econometric strategy inspired by De Loecker (2011) (see Appendix B). 27
Empirical results
I now apply the theoretical framework developed in section 2 to the FIBEN dataset in order to quantify the evolution of misallocation over time and its contribution to the variation in observed TFP.
To guard against the effect of mismeasurement I follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and trim the top and bottom 1% outliers of both physical and revenue productivity for each year and within each sector. After trimming the dataset includes 945,014 firm-year observations. I am interested in whether the characteristics of firms which suffer from a lack of resources (i.e., firms with high labor or capital distortions) differ from those which should be granted less inputs (i.e., firms with low labor or capital distortions).
distortions and firm characteristics
Firms' value added and capital stock increase monotonically with labor distortions. It suggests that for a given distribution of capital labor should optimally be reallocated from firms with relatively low nominal VA and capital stock to firms with relatively high nominal VA and capital stock: the mean firm in the fourth quartile produces 41% more and owns a capital stock 52% higher than its sector-year average, while the mean firm in the first quartile produces 43% less and owns 44% less capital. As for labor input itself the pattern is not so clear: the mean increases until Q3 but then decreases for the fourth quartile, while the labor input of the median firm is decreasing with labor distortions. The same observation applies to the age variable, both the mean and the median increasing until Q3 and then decreasing for the fourth quartile.
Regarding capital distortions, the mean of value-added, labor and capital decreases monotonically (although the median for value-added and labor in Q1 is lower than in Q2). It suggests 27 I do not claim that this econometric strategy enables me to control for all sources of endogeneity bias. Moreover it relies on arguably strong (although standard) assumptions. The main point here is to get reasonable estimates and to check if my main empirical results still hold when allowing for sector specific elasticities.
that for a given distribution of labor one can increase output by reallocating capital from firms with high nominal VA, high labor input and high capital stock to firms producing less with less inputs. The results for the capital variable are particularly striking: the capital stock of the mean firm in Q1 is 2.5 times larger than the sector-year average, while the mean firm in Q4 owns a capital stock more than 7 times smaller. Considering the age variable, it is again hard to draw any firm conclusion, both mean and median increasing then decreasing with capital distortions.
Tables 3 and 4 also provide useful information on the dispersion of both MRP distributions, and on the correlation with firms' productivity. On one hand substracting the median log-distortion in Q1 from the median log-distortion in Q4 indicates that the MRPK dispersion is higher than the MRPL dispersion (2.094 versus 0.809 for the difference between median logdistortions, 2.354 versus 0.946 for the difference between mean log-distortions). It suggests that there is relatively more room for capital reallocation than for labor reallocation if one wants to improve allocational efficiency. On the other hand TFPQ increases monotonically with both distortions, meaning that firms suffering from a lack of resources are also the most productive ones. However, the productivity gap between low MRPL and high MRPL firms is more pronounced: the mean firm in the fourth (first) labor distortion quartile is 59.8% more (46% less) productive than its sector-year average, while the mean firm in the fourth (first) capital distortion quartile is only 9.7% more (10.8% less) productive. Other things equal, this bigger productivity gap would make labor misallocation relatively worse than capital misallocation.
Finally, one can also notice in both tables that labor distortion slightly decrease with capital distortion. It suggests that firms which would be granted relatively more labor input (for a given capital allocation) would also be granted relatively less capital input (for a given labor allocation). Table 5 presents the magnitude of capital, labor and total misallocation as defined in section 2. First it is interesting to notice that the mean TFP losses one can attribute respectively to labor and capital distortions are very similar: in both cases, equalizing marginal revenue products when there are no distortions for the other input would boost aggregate TFP by 14.1% on average. As for total misallocation, I find that the mean TFP gap between the efficient inputs allocation and the observed one is equal to 28.6%. My results are comparable to those in Bellone and Mallen-Pisano (2013) (who also use french data on the manufacturing sector): the TFP loss I estimate is equal to 24.3% in 1998, 30% in 2001 and 30.7% in 2005, while they find a TFP gap of respectively 30.5%, 27.5% and 30.5%.
Misallocation and contribution to the variations in TFP
Furthermore, table 5 shows that misallocation seems to worsen over time. Capital misallocation is minimal in 1990, and culminates in 2012; labor misallocation reaches its minimum in 1991 and 1992, and is maximal in 2015; total misallocation is minimal in 1991, and reaches a peak in 2008. However, because firms appear in the dataset only when their sales exceed 750,000 euros, entry and exit between two consecutive years reflect this threshold effect and not necessarily firms shutting down their businesses. These artificial entry and exit make it hard to properly assess the evolution of misallocation over time, and its impact on productivity. Note: This table presents for each year the aggregate TFP (or equivalently aggregate output) loss due to allocational inefficiency. Total misallocation is the ratio between efficient TFP (i.e, the level of aggregate productivity one would obtain if inputs were optimally allocated within sectors) and observed TFP. Capital misallocation is the ratio between efficient TFP and the level of TFP one would obtain if, keeping unchanged capital distortions, labor was optimally allocated. Labor misallocation is the ratio between efficient TFP and the level of TFP one would obtain if, keeping unchanged labor distortions, capital was optimally allocated.
In order to cope with this issue I make use of additional data available at the banque de France, keeping track of the main judicial or administrative stages in the life of the firms, and gathered from registrars of commercial courts, journals of legal notices, or from the companies themselves. I focus on events associated with entry (first registration at the register of commerce) and exit (cessation of activity, judicial liquidation). To evaluate the change in misallocation between year t and year t+1 I consider the set of firms appearing either at t, t+1, or both; I drop from the sample firms which disappear in year t+1 but for which I have no event associated with exit at this date, and firms which appear in year t+1 but for which I have no event associated with entry at this date. Using this procedure I may drop from the sample firms which really stop their activities or which really start a business, but do not report it to legal institutions, and for which I have therefore no information. Thus I cannot claim that I do not drop any actual entry or exit; but I make sure that I drop every artificial ones. Then I compute the variation (in log) of misallocation and of its three components between t and t+1. Finally I assess the evolution of misallocation over time by summing the variations for all consecutive years. 
Robustness checks
In this section I perform the following robustness checks:
• I shut down the entry-exit channel by focusing only on incumbent firms 29
• I measure physical productivity using as labor input the wage bill declared by the firm, in order to control for the quality of the workforce and for the quantity of hours worked per employee expected the Great Recession to have a sizable impact on misallocation. 29 More precisely, I estimate the change in log-misallocation between year t and year t+1 by keeping only firms in activity at both t and t+1.
• I define sectors at the 2-digit level rather than at the 3-digit level
• I measure the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas aggregator by sectors' average weights, in order to make sure that changes in allocational efficiency are not driven by highmisallocation industries getting a higher/lower relative weight over time Appendix A. The log-normality assumption From equation (21) Therefore for each sector I estimate the elasticity of substitution by regressing log-nominal value added on the log of materials, allowing for a time fixed-effect and a firm fixed-effect.
Defining sectors at the three-digit level I estimate 85 elasticities of substitution; the average elasticity and the median elasticity are respectively equal to 3.2 and 3.1, therefore very close to the initial specification. The min elasticity is 1.8, the max 7.6, Q1 and Q3 are respectively equal to 2.7 and 3.5.
Appendix C. Robustness checks Note: This figure presents variations of aggregate misallocation and its three components over time in the French manufacturing sector. I estimate and use in my computations sector-specific elasticities of substitution. All series are in logs with 1990 normalized to 0. Table 7 : Changes in total misallocation and in its three components, shutting down the entryexit channel Table 8 : Changes in total misallocation and in its three components, using wage bills to measure productivity Table 10 : Changes in total misallocation and in its three components, keeping sectoral weights constant Table 11 : Changes in total misallocation and in its three components, using sector-specific elasticities
